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Until 2000 the legal institution of civil marriage was understood to be available only to one man and one woman. In 2000 Californians passed an initiative 
statute (Proposition 22) reaffirming that understanding. The 
California legislature then enacted a law authorizing domestic 
partnerships for same-sex couples that offer the same legal 
treatment as marriage under a different name.1 In 2008 
the California Supreme Court nullified Proposition 22 and 
construed the state constitution to mandate that marriage be 
redefined to be available to same-sex couples.2
At the next opportunity, just five months later, the people 
of California approved Proposition 8, which added to the state 
constitution: “Only marriage between a man and a woman is 
valid or recognized in California.” The initiative did not affect 
domestic partnerships.
Two same-sex couples who were denied marriage 
licenses after passage of Proposition 8 sued, challenging its 
constitutionality. The Governor, Attorney General, and other 
state officials refused to defend the law. Sponsors of Proposition 
8 intervened to defend it. Judge Vaughn Walker of the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of California held 
that the intervenors had standing to defend the law and 
that Proposition 8 violates both the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.3
The defendant-intervenors appealed to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. A three-judge panel of that court 
heard oral argument on the case in December 2010.4
I. Defendants’ Standing
An initial question is the standing of the defendant-
intervenors. In Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona5 the 
majority opinion by Justice Ginsburg expressed in dictum “grave 
doubts” whether sponsors of a ballot initiative have standing 
to defend it if elected officials refuse to do so. However, the 
purpose of ballot initiatives is to enable voters to enact laws 
that government officials refuse to adopt. To deny sponsors of 
initiatives standing to defend them would in effect privilege 
officials to nullify this democratic process. It is unlikely 
that the court of appeals or Supreme Court will allow such 
nullification.
II. Findings of Fact
In reaching his decision Judge Walker made several 
crucial—essentially dispositive—determinations that he 
labeled findings of fact. Ordinary findings of fact are reversed 
only if found on appeal to be clearly erroneous.6 However, 
the legislative and executive branches of government must 
constantly make findings of fact in order to formulate and 
enforce laws and regulations, and these “legislative facts” cannot 
be ignored by a trial court and are not subject to the “clearly 
erroneous” standard but to de novo review.
“Legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding 
and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by 
evidence or empirical data.”7 The burden is “on the one attacking 
the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable 
basis which might support it, whether or not the basis has a 
foundation in the record.”8 The issue, then, is whether the law 
satisfies the relevant standard of review, and this is an issue to 
be decided de novo by the appellate court, with due deference 
to democratic processes.
III. Issues Specific to Proposition 8
All but a few states have laws limiting marriage to one 
man and one woman. This suit certainly could have bearing 
on all those laws. Hesitant to overreach, the plaintiffs have 
struggled to identify particulars to differentiate Proposition 8 
from other state laws and thereby narrow the scope (and the 
threat) of a ruling in their favor. One such particular is that 
Proposition 8 was adopted after the California Supreme Court 
mandated recognition of same-sex marriages. Thus, it is claimed, 
Proposition 8 differs from other state marriage laws because 
it deprived same-sex couples of an existing right rather than 
simply withholding a right they never had. However, if a right 
is not constitutionally mandated, how can it be unconstitutional 
for a state that has granted the right to change its mind and 
withdraw it?
In a few cases, the Supreme Court has overturned laws 
that withdrew constitutionally-discretionary rights because the 
Court found that the laws were impelled by an impermissible 
motive. In Romer v. Evans9 for example, the Court struck 
down a Colorado constitutional amendment adopted by voter 
initiative that withdrew from the state legislature and local 
governments the power to enact laws against sexual-orientation 
discrimination. The majority said that the law was motivated by 
animus—a bare desire to harm—because it was not “directed 
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to any identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete objective.”10 
The majority further objected to the law because it amended 
the state constitution and thereby precluded those seeking laws 
against sexual-orientation discrimination from attaining them 
through ordinary legislation.
As the minority pointed out, the very purpose of 
constitutional provisions is to erect a barrier against ordinary 
legislation. Further, in many states constitutional provisions are 
the only laws that can be adopted by voter initiative. Therefore, 
to nullify such an initiative in effect deprives citizens of any 
power to act on a particular matter, even though the goal they 
seek is permissible under the Federal Constitution. Romer seems 
to make much of state constitutions unconstitutional.
The minority in Romer also noted that the Colorado 
initiative merely overrode local laws that were not constitutionally 
mandatory. However, the holding that the initiative had no 
“legitimate purpose” seems to mean that there would also be no 
legitimate purpose for not having laws against sexual-orientation 
discrimination to begin with, which would mean that such laws 
are constitutionally mandatory. Neither Romer nor any other 
Supreme Court decision, though, has so held.
Moreover, it is easy to find legitimate purposes for the 
initiative in Romer. In a free society, people are generally free to 
choose with whom to deal, even if others might consider one’s 
choices irrational or improper. Discrimination is forbidden only 
on a few select grounds. The people of Colorado might plausibly 
have believed that discrimination based on sexual orientation is 
tolerable or that any problems it creates were not serious enough 
to require the heavy burden of government intrusion through 
antidiscrimination laws.
One cannot claim that the whole structure of marriage, 
recognized by every civilization throughout history, was 
contrived solely to harm homosexuals. As discussed below, 
it is also easy to find a legitimate purpose for Proposition 8. 
However, Romer seems to be a constitutional wild card—a 
precedent with no firm meaning that can simply be played 
whenever five Justices feel like striking down a law they do not 
like but in which there is no constitutional flaw.
IV. Standard of Constitutional Scrutiny
The central issue of Perry is the constitutional validity of 
laws restricting legal marriage to a woman and a man. A key 
subsidiary issue is the standard of constitutional scrutiny by 
which such laws should be reviewed under the Equal Protection 
and Due Process Clauses. All laws create distinctions and 
thus treat people unequally, and all laws limit rights either by 
forbidding some kind of behavior or by granting benefits for 
some persons or conduct and not others. In general, however, 
a law satisfies the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses if 
the distinctions it makes have a rational basis. As noted above, 
this means only that there is some conceivable rational basis, 
even if that basis is not found in the record.
However, a few areas—those involving fundamental 
rights or distinctions that create a “suspect class”—are subject 
to strict scrutiny, requiring the state to show that the law 
serves a compelling interest that cannot be achieved by less 
discriminatory means.11 The paradigm category of strict 
scrutiny is supposed to be race12 because the Equal Protection 
Clause was adopted in the wake of the Civil War to protect 
the rights of former slaves who were being reduced to virtual 
serfdom by racially-discriminatory laws adopted in the former 
Confederate states.
Strict scrutiny is not necessarily fatal to discriminatory state 
action. For example, the Court has upheld racial preferences 
in university admissions on the factually dubious ground that 
racial diversity improves the quality of education.13
A strong argument can be made that traditional marriage 
serves a compelling state interest. The family is society’s most 
basic institution, and traditional marriage has always been 
considered crucial to the successful functioning of the family. 
The suffering of children in our neighborhoods where marriage 
has lost its prestige and has ceased to be the norm certainly 
argues for a compelling need to retain and promote traditional 
marriage.
However, strict scrutiny should not be the applicable 
standard. The Supreme Court has never applied anything more 
stringent than the rational basis standard to sexual orientation. 
The Court’s only decisions overturning laws based on sexual 
orientation are Romer, where the Court found no legitimate 
purpose for the law, and Lawrence v. Texas, which held only that 
disapproval of homosexual acts could not be enforced “through 
operation of the criminal law.”14 In both Lawrence and Romer 
the Court applied the rational basis standard. The Court in 
Lawrence said that Texas’s criminal sodomy law “furthers no 
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the 
personal and private life of the individual.”15 Perry involves no 
“intrusion into the personal and private li[ves]” of homosexuals. 
The Court in Lawrence said expressly that the case did “not 
involve whether the government must give formal recognition 
to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”16
The Equal Protection Clause was not intended originally 
to protect homosexuality. Lawrence might be defended on 
the ground that there had evolved a national consensus to 
tolerate private homosexual acts. Most states had repealed their 
criminal sodomy laws, and the few remaining laws were rarely 
enforced. In effect, these laws had ceased to be expressions 
of public morality and had become tools of arbitrary police 
harassment. It is not surprising that the Court would find such 
laws irrational.
Public attitudes about homosexual marriage are very 
different. Even if the meaning of equal protection can change 
with public consensus, that has not occurred here. Referenda 
on this issue have been held in thirty-one states, and in every 
one traditional marriage has been affirmed—usually by a large 
margin. Interracial marriage offers an instructive contrast. 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Loving v. Virginia 
(discussed further below), some state courts had struck down 
antimiscegenation laws. In none of these states was there a 
serious effort to restore the law by ballot initiative.
The Court has sometimes suggested that strict scrutiny 
applies to groups with “an immutable characteristic determined 
solely by birth.”17 This could be a very broad concept. 
Intelligence, for example, is to some significant extent 
hereditary, yet many state actions (like college admissions and 
matriculation) discriminate on the basis of intelligence. Even 
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traditional marriage is intended to encourage responsible 
procreation, a purpose that is clearly irrelevant to homosexual 
conduct.
Further, the concept arguably does not apply to 
homosexual marriage. First, it is unclear that sexual orientation 
is “determined solely by birth.” The American Psychiatric 
Association says “there are no replicated scientific studies 
supporting any specific biological etiology for homosexuality.”18 
In at least some cases sexual inclinations may be influenced by 
experience.
Second, the issue in Perry is not sexual orientation but 
sexual behavior, which is not immutable. Some cultures have 
condoned some forms of homosexual activity,19 and in these 
cultures such activity has been more common than in cultures 
where that activity is severely condemned. Californians 
could reasonably decide that they do not want to encourage 
homosexual conduct by honoring same-sex marriages.
Strict scrutiny may also apply to laws that discriminate 
against “discrete and insular minorities” that are subject to 
widespread discrimination.20 Homosexuals certainly have 
experienced discrimination, although there is some question 
how widespread this discrimination is now. Unlike African-
Americans, for example, homosexuals do not have lower average 
incomes than other Americans. California’s authorization of 
domestic partnerships with the same legal rights as marriage 
and the ability of opponents of Prop. 8 to raise more money 
for their campaign than its proponents did show further that in 
California homosexuals have significant political influence.
The passage of Prop. 8 alone does not establish that 
homosexuals in California are a powerless, oppressed minority 
needing constant judicial insulation from democracy. Every 
substantive law (and the rejection of every proposal for a new 
law) creates winners and losers. Supporters of many causes lose 
repeatedly, but not every such group is entitled to the privilege 
of strict scrutiny.
Most American marriage laws, for example, exclude not 
only same-sex couples, but also marriage of close relatives 
(“endogamy”) and marriage of groups of more than two persons 
(“polygamy” or “polyamory”). Supporters of these forms of 
marriage have not succeeded in any state, nor have they attained 
approval of civil unions or domestic partnerships for their 
relationships. Most advocates of same-sex marriage (including 
the plaintiffs in Perry) have not argued that these groups are 
“discrete and insular minorities” whose exclusion from marriage 
demands strict scrutiny review, yet it is hard to see why they 
(whose practices find more support in other societies than does 
same-sex marriage) do not merit as much judicial solicitude as 
homosexuals.
This inconsistency points to a more fundamental problem 
with the equal protection claim here. All parties in Perry agree 
that marriage is a privileged status. Plaintiffs do not challenge 
that status; they simply want same-sex couples to be eligible 
for it. However, if traditional marriage is unconstitutionally 
discriminatory, can any privileged status for marriage be 
upheld? The defense of traditional marriage is that it promotes 
responsible bearing and raising of children. If that defense is 
constitutionally inadequate, what constitutional justification 
is there for privileging marriage at all? Proponents of same-sex 
marriage do not answer this question.
V. The Fundamental Right to Marry
Judge Walker held that Proposition 8 violates the Due 
Process Clause by denying homosexuals a fundamental 
right of people to marry as they please. The Supreme Court 
has sometimes recognized a constitutional right to marry.21 
However, this right has always been limited, and the Court has 
never held or even hinted in dictum that the right extended to 
same-sex couples.
Same-sex marriage is very different from the cases 
where the Court has recognized a right to marry. In Loving v. 
Virginia,22  the Court overturned a law forbidding interracial 
marriage. However, California does not forbid homosexual 
marriage; it simply does not license it, but leaves it as a private 
matter. Further, California offers homosexuals all the legal 
benefits of marriage, withholding only the label. The Court 
has never suggested that there is a fundamental right to the 
label “marriage.”
As noted, the limitation of marriage to opposite-sex 
couples is only one of several traditional restrictions on marriage. 
The parties must be unmarried, i.e., no polygamy. The parties 
must not be too closely-related, i.e., no endogamy. And the 
parties must be adults, i.e., no child marriage. Unlike the same-
sex requirement, all these practices have been condoned in many 
societies. If there is a fundamental right to same-sex marriage, 
a fortiori all the other practices must be permitted. It seems 
unlikely that the Supreme Court wants to take such a step.
The fundamental right to marry should mean the right 
to enter into a relationship that falls within the traditional 
definition of marriage, not to legal recognition of whatever 
arrangement some person or group of people wants to label 
marriage. The law struck down in Loving was a sharp departure 
from the traditional definition of marriage in Western 
civilization, which never forbade interracial marriages.23 If 
anything, then, Loving is a precedent for adhering to, rather than 
nullifying, the exclusion of same-sex marriage because, unlike 
interracial marriages, Western civilization has never recognized 
same-sex relationships as marriages.
VI. The Case for (Traditional) Marriage
Judge Walker held that the “purported rationales” for 
the non-recognition of same-sex marriage “are nothing more 
than post-hoc justifications” by Prop. 8’s proponents. As with 
his finding that Prop. 8 was motivated by a desire to harm 
homosexuals, this conclusion seems to rest on the premise 
that the institution of marriage was fabricated in every culture 
throughout history for the sole purpose of stigmatizing 
homosexuals.
Our society generally leaves adults free to arrange their 
own affairs. However, a woman and a man can create children 
who cannot protect their own interests. Marriage practices have 
varied among cultures in myriad ways. However, whatever else 
marriage is about (e.g., caste or property), it has always been 
centrally concerned with the bearing and raising of children. 
As Bertrand Russell said: “But for children, there would be no 
need for any institution concerned with sex. . . . [I]t is through 
children alone that sexual relations become of importance to 
society.”24
Marriage both memorializes and solemnizes the 
relationship of a man and woman and provides the basis for an 
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enforceable legal commitment among them and their children. 
Marriage both reminds the parties and informs the world that 
they have entered into a relationship with responsibilities to 
each other and to the human lives they may create. In so doing, 
it encourages them to plan for responsible procreation, which 
includes not only conception but everything that might affect 
children. We know, for example, that married men work longer 
hours, commit fewer crimes, and abuse drugs and alcohol less 
than unmarried men. In other words, marriage works.
The district court held that “same-sex parents and 
opposite-sex parents are of equal quality.”25 It is not clear exactly 
what this means or what is the basis for the statement. However, 
there have been no studies comparing same-sex parents with 
married, biological parents. If the district court’s statement 
means that the two are the same, it has no basis in fact. If it 
means something else, it is not relevant to the constitutionality 
of marriage.
Moreover, there are good reasons to believe that the 
finding is inaccurate. Innumerable studies have found the 
traditional family to be better for children than families with 
a single parent or cohabiting couples. If the district court is 
right, then cohabiting same-sex couples are better parents than 
cohabiting opposite-sex couples. The district court pointed to 
no studies purporting to support such a finding.
Same-sex couples can be allowed to adopt, but adoption 
is a legal event, not a biological act as is reproduction. Adopted 
children can be better protected through adoption proceedings 
and custody regulation than by fitting the square peg of same-
sex relationships into the round hole of marriage.
The district court declared that “[p]ermitting same-sex 
couples to marry will not affect the number of opposite-sex 
couples who marry, divorce, cohabit, have children outside 
of marriage or otherwise affect the stability of opposite-sex 
marriages.”26 The only empirical basis the court gave for 
that finding was that recognition of same-sex marriages in 
Massachusetts supposedly has not affected rates of marriage 
and divorce.
This is not a firm basis on which to brand traditional 
marriage as irrational bigotry. First, Judge Walker’s empirical 
finding may not be correct. Defendant-intervenors cited 
studies showing that divorce rates rose and marriage rates fell 
in Massachusetts from 2004 to 2007.27 Similarly, marriage 
rates have declined and illegitimacy rates have risen in the 
Netherlands since it recognized same-sex marriages.
Further, the Massachusetts law has been in effect only 
briefly. More time is needed to determine its long-term effects, 
such as whether it will influence the raising of children and 
the use of artificial reproduction. Moreover, Massachusetts is a 
small state in a large country, in nearly all of which traditional 
marriage still prevails. Massachusetts may be atypical. Even its 
own residents may consider its law an aberration, not a general 
change of the meaning of marriage.
There are also substantial reasons to think that recognizing 
homosexual marriage would impair the social prestige of 
marriage. At trial both plaintiffs and defendant-intervenors 
introduced expert statements that validating same-sex marriage 
would radically alter the institution.28 Some gay activists support 
same-sex marriage for the express purpose of destroying its 
social standing.29
Recognizing same-sex marriage would transform marriage 
from its immemorial function as an arrangement centrally 
concerned with children to one primarily for the gratification of 
adults. As discussed above, thirty-one states have held referenda 
on the issue, and in every one the voters favored traditional 
marriage, usually by large margins. It is hard to believe that a 
Supreme Court decision branding the majority of Americans 
(and, indeed, virtually all human beings who have ever lived) as 
irrational bigots because they believe there is something special 
about the ability of a woman and a man to create human life 
would not diminish public respect for marriage.
Much of the legal benefit of marriage is achieved 
through the expressive function of law—the effect of the law 
in promoting certain norms by the law’s symbolic support. 
Perhaps the esteem for marriage generated by the law’s symbolic 
support would be impaired by extending it to intrinsically sterile 
relationships, but  this esteem  may be less impaired if a different 
label is used. Whether one thinks that California domestic 
partnerships go too far or not far enough in recognizing same-
sex relationships, that approach is not irrational.
 VII. Future Proceedings
If, as expected, the Ninth Circuit panel affirms the district 
court’s decision, the defendants could seek an en banc rehearing, 
or head for the Supreme Court as quickly as possible. The latter 
would set the stage for a Supreme Court hearing and decision 
in its 2011-12 Term, thus making the case a potential issue in 
the 2012 presidential and other elections. 
Conclusion
The Constitution confers no right to legal validation of 
same-sex marriage. As Judge Richard Posner has said, “If there 
is such a right, it will have to be manufactured by the justices 
out of whole cloth.”30 For the Supreme Court to do so would 
gravely damage its legitimacy and invite efforts to change the 
composition of the Court. However justified the public anger 
at the obliteration of traditional marriage, such moves would 
create a dangerous precedent. It is hoped that the Court will 
not provoke such action.
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